The
West Point Atlas of American Wars: Volume I 1689-1900 *****
Vincent Esposito makes masterly use of maps to explain the strategy
behind the Civil War and other conflicts of the era. Strategy leading
up to the battles and the battles themselves are well covered - not only
with maps but with excellent and concise explanations. In addition
to the Civil War, the sections on the Mexican War and Spanish-American War
are excellent. These are better maps than those on the West Point website
which are simplified to fit a shorter curriculum. Readers of this book
will gain an impressive understanding of the war.
The
Civil War Battlefield Guide ****1/2 Hundreds of
battles are covered with topo maps are used for the more significant
battles. Even a relatively obscure battle like Cloyds Mountain and
Second Kernstown get a maps. Importantly, smaller battles
are placed into the context of the larger battles and campaigns. Although
it isn't perfect, it is an indispensable touring guide, probably the best
available.
Last Chance for Victory***** By Scott Bowden and Bill Ward. Although marred
by typographical errors, this is one of the best military history books I've
ever read. The authors analyze Lee's generalship and convincingly
argue a number of controversial assertions. Specifically that - it was
impractical and improper to send troops from Virginia to relieve Vicksburg.
That Lee did not issue discretionary orders but rather orders with
discretion that allowed the subordinate to decide how best to complete the
task. That Stuart's ride around the Union army was therefore against
orders, and it was originally intended as a ride THROUGH the Union army.
That Ewell's orders were also not discretionary so he too disobeyed orders
in not capturing the high ground. That delays in Longstreet's
deployment were reasonable and his performance on July 2nd was superb.
That a Confederate attack on July 3rd was the proper decision, but that the
attack was not properly supported, and Longstreet's performance was poor.
Bowden's Napoleonic expertise is very useful regarding staff work.
Although many authors mention the problem, Bowden vividly illustrates it by
showing how Napoleon successfully used many times the number of staff
officers that Civil War armies used, and he explains their functions.
The authors also explain the en echelon attack on the 2nd, and show that it
succeeded in its purpose of diverting Union troops away from the rest of the
Union line. They also show that the failure to extend the attack along
the whole line resulted in failure, and they explain who was responsible and
why. The opportunity on the 2nd was great as Meade's shifting of
troops had completely denuded some sections of his line. Although too
much ink has obviously been spilled on this battle, you should not miss this
book.
The Bloody Crucible of Courage: Fighting Methods and
Combat Experience in the Civil War ***** by Brent
Nosworthy. Most Civil War historians devote themselves solely to this
one individual war and completely lack any tactical context. As a result, most works
parrot the same tired old ideas - "Napoleonic tactics used beyond
their time" and "the first modern war". Brent Nosworthy has studied
tactics of the entire gunpowder era, producing unmatched works on the18th Century and
the Napoleonic
era showing the complex inter-relations of combat arms and highlighting the
importance of the psychology and motivation of individual soldiers.
Now, he has given the same sort of treatment to the Civil War. He
discusses the European developments in weapons
and tactics in the first half of 19th Century. He shows the
underappreciated increased lethality of the new combination gun-howitzers
with longer range and exploding shells. Discussing the debate on
infantry tactics, he shows not only the increased accuracy of rifled muskets - but
also the negative effects of their slower muzzle velocity as well as the
constants constraints of battle - fear and smoke. He shows that some visionaries
in Europe foresaw - too early - the effects of new infantry weapons, but
he also shows
that skeptics, particularly in Britain, did exist. He shows that
"Napoleonic tactics", when written by participants in the Civil War,
actually meant tactics developed by Napoleon III, an innovator in
artillery as well as in infantry tactics, including the use of a gymnastic pace to reach the enemy more quickly, as
well as
the development of Zouave units. In discussing cavalry, Nosworthy shows that cavalry
attacks in the 1859 Italian War had been disrupted by long
range artillery fire the likes of which had not possible in Napoleon's time.
Nevertheless, he shows that cavalry could and did successfully attack
infantry during the Civil War. But by 1864, when cavalry
had the training and experience to do so, there were earthworks and other
factors preventing attacks on infantry. In his chapter on grand
tactics Nosworthy shows that imitation of Jomini's reactionary line-heavy
formations made Civil War combat less decisive than Napoleonic combat in
which columns allowed for maneuver and co-operation with cavalry.
Despite some flaws (see other reviews), overall this is the best
book on Civil War tactics yet written, and will make you think of Civil
War combat in a whole new way.
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